121 recorded that which people said in formal and informal inter-
123 views, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate, in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to select a central vantage point from which I could view the everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close relationship between residence and group membership, by the very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

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*613 In consideration of the time element, I made the decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more freedom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist.

•[829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

648 727 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

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Change and Present Attitudes

648 177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
• 829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

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829 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

[576]
[778]

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641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

[65]

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423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
179 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
169 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
619 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
597 genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
• [829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
179 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
*613 • 829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
•829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may be properly interpreted as property relations between groups. Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an essential premise upon which the social and political order rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a$_{A}^{1}$ shows the correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79) in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity" and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how they combine to become "the condition of community in political

1, [See p. 66--Analyst]
A

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing f[illegible]den about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
•829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint 'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.
•829

But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotamy between the bint 'amm daira (daira =
*613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
[578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
159 take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and
[182] contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

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182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's
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182 brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value
[181] of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

604
538 There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as tem-
• [829] plates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

000 182 601 602 604 [114] kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint 'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an individual marries into an outside group, or even within the secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad) at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting age-mates of the local descent group.

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Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group par excellence.

604 582 [829]

000 par excellence.

604 829 867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of 604 602 582 bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to [605] ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

604 582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

• [829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

582 *613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never really becomes a member of the lineage. [587] Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

586 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on
829 the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family.
586 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was
829 politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about
123 divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr
[583] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at
[768] the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid
[595]

586 851 * 613 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all children from a marriage belong to the husband and become members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants 12 58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife. • [829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal 595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage 182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as [587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only [582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

*613 682 554 57 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before the whole tribe."

*613 554 682 [692] The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of 682 178 [626] blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out [619] [721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between • [829] the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a *613 682 554 578 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the [571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political order.

571 672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance, *613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is 571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if 672 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not *613 426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt [558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his [681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was disagreement among my informants as to whether or not they 682 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an *613 •829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question 124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion, which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment 682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function 681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office, 182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from 571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the Fatiha (the first sura of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the 'awaiyid is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the 'awaiyid follows the command-
771 ments of God. One 'aqila speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
577

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
•[829] to "the good society." Another 'aqila, in reply to my question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
• [829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

554 571 627 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount." Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in the social structure, contributes to this social harmony necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 571 627 829 [691] * [613] The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair, or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand, the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627
• [829] violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
* [613] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
[577] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.

An informant said that

[539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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[539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

554 One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:
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> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
•829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

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> There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin
571 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
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554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
[556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
•829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future. In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

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554 [571] [198] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can [792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] [691] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins * [613] • [829] point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

114 634 666 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Nevertheless, before I left the field I discussed the pending election with some of my informants and members of the 114 634 666 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations 124 with the government. As one informant said: "The present 829 *[613] 'umda and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 571 666 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding the election of a new incumbent to the office of 'umda. In this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the distribution of power than with the actual person who will 124 *613 634 571 666 fill the authority role. One informant, an 'aqila, gave indication that formal authorities support the "status group" and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

> Mustafa, the brother of the 'umda, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The 'umda told me that he was going to ask the 'awaaqil to sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new 'umda. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the 'umda). Even if Mustafa does not want to be the 'umda, the 'awaaqil will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were 'umdas before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an 'umda while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

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and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished) with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj 'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

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We can see how these details carry larger implications within the context of political and social structures undergoing change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds important for an understanding of the process of change.

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If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is politically active and representative in both the traditional and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social and personal reasons.

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Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came around to the subject of international politics, whether this was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
• 829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the 156 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood- 159 554 revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

• 829 682 The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [778] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
[182] point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
* 613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpre-
meditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

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Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
•829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
178 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
177 Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
• 829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
[244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
[489] plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
[871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
[207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
[212] (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
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178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

One informant once told me,
124 "If you don't greet me, this means that you hate me, and if you
576 hate me, there is no limit to the kind of harm you can do me and
829 my family. One who hates you can kill you, and none can walk safely anywhere if he fears that he will be killed."

682 As Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi reached the general store, every-
689 one was gathering there as usual, including the two awaqil who
672 were involved in the original settlement. Sheikh Suliman told
695 Mahdi not to dismount his donkey and not to say the customary
554 greeting as they passed by the gathering. When they passed the
792 gathering, everyone stood to greet Sheikh Suliman who ignored them
576 and left with Mahdi. No one believed that Sheikh Suliman, who should be the guard of the tribal tradition, should commit such an unforgivable violation of the norms of the people. The next morn-
682 ing the whole area was talking about a big Mi'ad to "take the right"
689 from Sheikh Suliman and Mahdi, who had insulted the gathering. The
672 Mi'ad was held a week after the incident. During the Mi'ad, Sheikh
695 Suliman was asked to explain his behavior, and his answer was, "How
554 do you want me to greet all those people who were sitting in front
792 of the store? There were more than thirty men in that gathering,
576 and I was afraid that if I said the customary greeting, I might
627 have startled some of them causing them to harm themselves, leaving me with the payment of so many bloodmoneys." Immediately, the attendants of the Mi'ad knew what Sheikh Suliman was referring to, and that his action was to prove that the settlement reached in the case of Mahdi was wrong and that it set a very dangerous precedent which would cause people to avoid greeting one another, "and hatred will prevail among brothers and nobody will be safe in his own home."

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

absolutely obligatory and sinful to omit. I very much doubt whether many of the Bedouin know how to pray in the prescribed manner. As I have mentioned earlier, the Bedouin used to give alms to their zawiyas and in doing so they carried out one of the five major duties of a Muslim, but they regarded these alms as charity rather than legal dues. I have never met an ordinary Bedouin who had been to Mecca, or who even contemplated going there. Nevertheless, however lax they may be in other things, all Cyrenaican Bedouin keep the fast of Ramadan, and in this annual fast is summed up for them, more than in anything else, the obligations and privileges of Islam and its unity and strength. Moreover, although they are negligent Muslims themselves they respect piety in others. Brothers of the Sanusiya Order and religious men in general ought to pray regularly. That is their business and it is very necessary for the well-being of the community and worthy of liberal support, but the Bedouin is an unlettered man, a shepherd, and a warrior, and he has his own affairs to see to. Perhaps the Bedouin make up for their shortcomings by their enthusiasm for the *jihad*, holy war against unbelievers. They consider that they have fulfilled their obligation under this head in ample measure by their long and courageous fight, formally declared a holy war by the Caliph of Islam, against the Italians, the French, and the British. A Bedouin once said to me when I remarked how rarely I had seen Bedouin at prayer: '*nasum wa najhad*', '(but) we fast and we wage holy war'.

It must also be said that it would be an error to suppose that Islam had not, long before the time of the Grand Sanusi, strongly affected the character and custom of the Sulaimid Bedouin. This question, which is far from simple, need not be discussed in the present account and it is only necessary to note that the Bedouin assume that their customs are Muslim customs. It would also be a questionable judgement to assert that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica are not religious because they do not pay the same attention to outward ritual as do townspeople and peasants, for piety and holiness, as we have often been admonished, are not the same. The Bedouin certainly have a profound faith in God and trust in the destiny He has prepared for them and this faith and trust enhance that superb dignity

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*175 *648 Muslim hospice at al-Madina for the pilgrims. They ensured that the meat of their Muslim troops was prepared in the prescribed manner. In 1937 Balbo, at the request of some of the Muslim notables, forbade the sale of alcoholic drinks in the month of Ramadan. Exhibitions of fakirism by the ecstatic religious Orders were prohibited in 1935 to please the *'Ulama* who regarded them as an undesirable innovation. Mussolini thought, like Napoleon, that it was good policy to build up for himself a reputation of being the defender of Islam. The supreme moment of this burlesque was when the notables of Tripoli presented him on his visit to Libya with 'The Sword of Islam', an event commemorated by a huge equestrian statue in the middle of the town.

*175 *648 ● 829 The Bedouin was not impressed with this Islamic propaganda, which even the more impressionable townsman thought highly ridiculous, especially the building of mosques by Christians. Those the Italians built outside the towns were neglected, for the Bedouin preferred to use his own prayer-places or the mosques of the Sanusiya lodges, where these had not been destroyed, when he felt the need to pray at all. Government qadis were of little interest to him, for in law and custom he followed tribal tradition, and such priestly services as he required were performed by his faqihs and zawiya Shaikhs. If the Italians liked to restore the tombs of his saints he was unconcerned. If they liked to encourage the pilgrimage, so much the better for those who felt the need, unfelt by himself, to make it. The Bedouin was a Sanusi and the Italians had driven the revered Heads of his Order into exile and had plundered and abolished the Order itself. He could hardly be expected to feel, and certainly did not feel, that the Italians were sincere in their professed respect for Islam.

*[795]

*175 *648 The Italians based their claim to Arab regard on two considerations, their respect for Islam and their social services. I shall not describe in detail Italian measures designed to raise the standard of culture and living among the Bedouin, for their efforts in this direction were little advanced by 1940, but it is necessary to refer briefly to their educational policy. The Turks had provided instruction only in the towns, only during the last years of their rule, and only on a very modest scale. The only schools in the Bedouin districts were those of the Sanusiya lodges.

*[795] [794]

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stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and the population aggregates supported on these territories run from over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

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ambiguity surrounding the actual names and their correct position occurred at about the fifth ascending generation. Whenever this point was reached in the recordings, arguments would flare up over the names to be included or excluded and over the relation of these names to those above and below, with the result that for several people of the same segment there would be several versions of a genealogy which differed only at this one point. An example of this sort is given below from the genealogy of the Nasr section, which shows seven different versions of the arrangement of ancestors round about the fifth ascending generation from the living.

The confusion at and around the fifth ascending generation appeared with such regularity in the genealogies that I feel justified in referring to it as 'the area of ambiguity'. It seems likely, moreover, that in any society where the lineage structure is closely tied to the territorial disposition of groups, since the genealogy is so rigid, there needs to be in it somewhere an area of ambiguity if it is to be related to reality. Without this ambiguity, the form of the genealogy is too rigid to comprehend changes which occur. This point in the genealogy came to assume critical significance as the point where adjustments in it are made. Other kinds of evidence point to the same conclusion.



FIG. 18-3 GENEALOGY 3. *There is another section, al-Dawwas, which belongs to this group, but to include this as well would greatly complicate the issue without giving any additional information.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9 Cyrenaica

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which ' the one word does for all '. Corporate identity is conceptualized as ' one bone ' or ' one body '. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence against all; if one of its members is killed ' we all lose blood '. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the ' owner of the blood ', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: ' You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood-money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion. Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the ' owner of the blood ' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution. In Bedouin thinking, an injury to ' the one body ' is an injury to all its parts. Blood-money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed

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682 602 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 562 613 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone ' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into [582] [591] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 682 613 829 619 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 114 613 619 829 578

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121 613 114 [619] [624] [578] part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud. Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 613 571 622 114 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of, say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action. In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 613 114 [621] Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another. Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

[619] [621]

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121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
[602] assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
[604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

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121 613 682 674 829 604 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma. The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say, that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of [554] the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local [682] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give [584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies [429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian, and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men [422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their [583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

121 613 606 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 613 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

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121 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away
613 into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access
582 to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups.
121 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homi-
613 cide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can,
582 as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feud-
578 ing secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of
682 that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary
613 section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the
682 structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives
829 are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the
121 odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a
613 par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two
682 men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

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121 613 682 is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana'*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana'* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ' one day, it must be repudiated '.[1] It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana'* the terms in which it was demanded were: ' You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana'*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ' gift ' of a wife to the victim's group.[2] The wife is ' given ' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. [829] Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ' in this particular case, it just so happened ' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

[581] [585]

[1] See Peters, 1966.

[2] A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

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south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition, the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not depart from the framework set by informants—the agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and so on is explained by informants in different languages as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

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835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in
[682] the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which
[684] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
613 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

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851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes
[837] aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

[585] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

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sorts of petty ways, listen to his grumbles about his agnates, interfere on his behalf in petty camp quarrels, shield him from the disciplinarian father and guard his property interests against the predatory father's brother; if the mother's brother dies without heirs, the sister's son can reasonably expect at least a share of his wealth. When the mother's brother is a member of a different corporate group, a sister's son cannot possibly expect to inherit from him in any circumstance.

The mother's brother may reside in a camp too distant to be much effective direct help in day-to-day living. His relative remoteness gives the relationship other possible opportunities, however. Rainfall in the semi-desert area of Cyrenaica is highly variable, both from year to year, and from place to place in any given year. As a result this shallow saucer of a depression may have sufficient rain to supply both the water needs of animals and crops, while an area a few miles distant will have inadequate water supplies for either. The mother's brother-sister's son link can mean water for animals and a crop of barley for both when, in successive years, the resources of one area or the other are inadequate.

The differences in the relations between men and their mother's brother do not end with a characterisation of their antipodal forms. The demographic structure of a group may be such that one man may have a number of mother's brothers, another only one; one man may have to share with several brothers, another may be an only son. Complications of this sort determine the precise relationships between men, but however intricate these may be, each corporate group has its matrilateral links with a group occupying a slightly different ecological area, and it also has a plurality of matrilateral connections within it. Further, if a direct connection is not available to any particular individual he can use an indirect link (e.g. father's mother's brother or mother's mother's brother) to satisfy his needs.

The Preference for Males

Thus far, the family and the social matrix in which it is embedded has been discussed in general terms, most particularly in reference to several selected sets of relationships. I wish now to place these relationships in a more specific setting with a brief discussion of the composition of a small camp of a group inhabiting the arid areas of central Cyrenaica. When the Bedouin give their views on the structure of the family in Cyrenaica they speak of it as consisting of a pair of spouses and about ten children, mainly males. The emphasis on males is not mere sentiment, overwhelmingly though it favours them against females. Additional males in a family increase the productive possibilities of a family in the sense that more herdsmen become available and larger ploughing commitments can be undertaken; an increase in the number of females has small effect on production since they are precluded from any direct participation in these activities. Both sexes, ranging in age from about seven years to mature adulthood, are necessary if a family

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829 594 562 858 is to constitute a viable economic unit; and if it is to expand, the number of males must be increased disproportionately compared with females. Since the structure of this "ideal family" (which in the sentiments of the Bedouin is the only family) is based on the division of labour, some details of the tasks and their allocation among members of a family are included to estimate the importance of this notional "ideal family."

The Division of Labour, by Sex

462 286 The tasks women perform are almost entirely associated with the tent. They make the tent top, and the gaily coloured carpets which cover the sandy ground in the men's quarters. They also weave the material for making sacks, and nose bags for horses and camels. Throughout the year a piece of weaving is always on the loom waiting, and while any women of the tent may take a turn at weaving, the mother decides what is to be made, its pattern and colours and in general directs operations. Women also pitch 462 342 the tent when the camp is moved; they do so unaided by the men. It is a task which requires considerable strength and only grown girls and mature women can assist in this; younger girls scour the vicinity in search of stones to hold the sides of the tent on the ground after it has been erected. [356] As soon as pitching is complete, the floor of the tent is brushed clean before carpets are spread and the few articles of personal belongings placed in their proper position.

462 313 Next, brushwood must be fetched in large quantities for fires. Apart from cooking needs and winter warmth, the fire of each tent is in constant use for preparing the sickly sweet tea, almost the consistency of syrup, which is drunk several times a day regularly and which is made again for even the casual visitor. The task of fetching brushwood is performed daily, and each load takes a few hours of a woman's time to gather and bring back [412] to the tent. Bushes are uprooted with the aid of a long-handled adze and piled together, to be carried on her back for the homeward journey. The load is cumbersome and heavy; only girls in their late teens and mature women can cope with it.

462 252 412 All cooking is done by the women. Most meals consist of cereal dishes of various sorts, so that grinding, using heavy millstones, is a perpetual activity to satisfy the demands for large quantities of flour. Millstones are bought in the villages. In most small camps there only one or two sets, so they are passed round from one woman to another. The stones are very heavy but when they are carried from tent to tent men offer no assistance.

462 312 [492] Each tent also requires large quantities of water for human consumption. If the camp is located near a well, water is drawn in small quantities, frequently. Young girls and boys take a donkey to the well, fill a couple of jerry cans with water, wait for an older sister to load them on the donkey and then drive the beast back to camp. After a fall of rain, while puddles of water remain on the ground, mature women make haste to gather the